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1.
The question of the place, role and tasks of philosophers in postmodernity is 
perplexing and complicated. I am going to talk here about French and Ameri­
can thinkers, but always having Central Europe in mind. And the question of 
the social, cultural and political status of philosophers in postmodernity is one 
of the most intriguing today, especially considering its self-referentiality: phi­
losophers asking questions about themselves...
Let us refer here first to several points of interest, several catchwords that 
evoke the whole complicated heart of the matter: Martin Heidegger, one of the 
greatest philosophical minds in the twentieth century, with his Nazi illusions in 
1933 and later, Paul de Man, the future founder of the American deconstructio­
nist school of literary criticism, in the years of 1940-42 and later (that "later" 
being no less important for current discussions), the Historikerstreit in Germa­
ny among German historians and philosophers in the eighties. I would say the 
following: the material for the discussions that are of interest to me today are 
the most traumatic events of the twentieth century and the behavior of the phi­
losopher, or in broader terms, the intellectual, associated with them. We can 
add to them Sartre's conception of the "committed literature", Georges Batai- 
lle's fascinations with the war, Maurice Blanchot's fascist texts from the pre­
war "Combat" journal, "Maoist" involvement of the French intellectuals in the 
hot sixties, Michel Foucault's enthusiasm with respect to the Iranian "spiritual 
revolution", Noam Chomsky's (as well as Jean Beaufret's) basically positive 
attitude to "revisionist" historians who negate gassing in Auschwitz etc. If we 
add that all, we can see a certain complex of questions and issues the penetra­
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tion of which may be one of today's "tasks of thinking", one of organizing prin­
ciples within philosophy of culture.
My idea in the present paper is that it is perhaps worthwhile to treat the re­
cent philosophical "affairs" or "cases" somehow collectively. Not much per­
haps can be revealed by just one of them, but the discussions in question are in 
fact similar to one another, at least when we look at them from the perspective 
of the question of freedom and responsibility of the philosopher (the intellectu­
al) today, or from that of his social and political self-image. I hope that the qu­
estions asked about not so distant past, about those political fascinations and 
those political seductions, will help us, following Jean-Luc Nancy, to think 
about ourselves, our present history, perhaps even -  our future. Therefore I 
would like to skip in my considerations Heidegger himself or de Man himself, 
leaving them to Heideggerians and deconstructionists, respectively. What I see 
as important is what the history of the two thinkers can tell us about our histo­
ry, about ourselves here and now. For, I suppose, the rethinking of past cho­
ices, attitudes, past silences, writing, and activism is the rethinking of the con­
stitutive elements of our not so distant past rather than rethinking of some 
"aberrations", "mistakes", human "failings" or "weaknesses" (to use several 
descriptions applied to Martin Heidegger). And what we mean here is the 
thought that deliberately served ideology, that hid behind it, profiting from it. 
That gap is very important -  we mean using ideology in promoting one’s own 
thought in a naive belief that one (as an intellectual, as a philosopher) can be 
the "guide of leaders". That is precisely the affiliation to a greater power, so 
criticized by Richard Rorty recently.
Let us remind now briefly a couple of penetrating questions and statements 
that could be heard recently in the context that interests us here in thinking 
about the self-image of the philosopher. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in Heide­
gger, Art, and Politics says the following: "Heidegger's commitment in 1933 
was neither a mistake nor a fault" and it is "totally coherent with his thought" -  
it is not a product of a mistake that just happened to a thought but it reveals 
what constantly threatens that thought, reveals its danger. Emmanuel Levinas 
in "Comme un consentement à l'horrible" asks: "But does not his silence on the 
subject of gas chambers and death camps in the times of peace testify to the 
depths of a soul totally inaccessible to compassion and to as if consent to a hor­
ror?" Hans-Georg Gadamer, in his “Return from Syracuse", says the following: 
"In 33 and 34 Heidegger thought that he followed his dream and fulfilled his 
deepest philosophical mission when he attempted to revolutionize the univer­
sity from the bottom". Jean-François Lyotard, Heidegger and 'the jews': "In his 
dossier, the most serious accusation was written on blank pages: it was his 
stubborn silence about the Holocaust".
In the school of American deconstructionists -  to change the terrain for a 
moment and pass on to the aftermath of de Man's "affair" in the States -  there
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appear such essential questions as "is the work I am doing complicit with so­
mething that associating me with would appall me?” (Deborah Esch asks). We 
want to know who we are sleeping with, we need "safe criticism"... From the 
Responses. On Paul de Man Wartime Journalism volume there emerges a pic­
ture of polemics about de Man as a field of a final struggle with deconstruction 
as such: it is, namely, the greatest threat to the American nation, its common 
public number one enemy. As Derrida explains in his "Biodegradables", the 
real stakes "were not only, and not first of all, de Man of the 1940-42, but the 
deconstruction of 1989". And I suggest that it is interesting to have another lo­
ok at that hot debate from a distance and see it as a manifestation of current 
discussions not about a concrete biographical and philosophical issue, youthful 
years of a significant literary critic in hard times, but as a discussion about the 
place in society, tasks and obligations of the intellectual in postmodernity.
Let us give it a thought -  what may underline such focusing of attention and 
intellectual energy on seemingly easy questions pertaining to life on the one, 
and work on the other hand of several figures of the twentieth century philo­
sophy and literary theory, or on absurd and seemingly easily refutable state­
ments of several revisionist historians of the Holocaust -  to refer for a moment 
to the so-called “Faurisson's theses” in France. So once again: Heidegger, de 
Man. What did Heidegger say and what did he keep silence about when others 
were silent or were leaving Germany, and when others were speaking after 
their return to Germany following the second world war? Why did he kept si­
lence about the Holocaust until his death, even in his famous testamentary "Der 
Spiegel" interview, even in his conversation with Paul Celan who waited for it 
so much; was not his silence "unbearable" and "inexcusable" as Lyotard in 
Heidegger and 'the jews' and Lacoue-Labarthe in Heidegger, Art, and Politics 
put it? Was Paul de Man a (hidden) anti-Semite during his whole life or just 
during his Belgium "collaborationist" years and what may have stood behind 
his "aestheticism" or even "quietism"? Is there really anything morally distur­
bing that binds Nietzsche, Heidegger, de Man and Derrida? And finally Robert 
Faurisson explicitly negating gassing in Auschwitz: what did he betray that he 
managed to cause such an intellectual storm in France of the early eighties, that 
the wound was so deep that required years-long polemic simultaneously from 
various sides (e.g. of Lyotard in his splendid book, The Differend. Phrases in 
Dispute, or of Pierre Vidal-Naquet in his Assassins o f Memory). How is one "to 
live with Faurisson" (regarding that case broader), how to "discuss" with him 
without according him the status of an equal disputant (which on ethical gro­
unds seems just impossible)? These were some recent ethical questions in 
France to cope with. How weak must be the place of the intellectual in French 
culture today that such a Faurisson is able to engage in his discussions so many 
philosophers? Questions put on the margins of these "affairs" are appearing all 
over the world: what is "freedom of the intellectual", "freedom of the philo-
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sopher", and what is their "ethics". When the unshaken life of former leaders of 
human souls is disturbed, they start to engage in self-analysis, start to take care 
of themselves or of their predecessors, looking for their own self-definitions. 
When their self-image trembles, what also trembles is their place in culture, 
lifelong vocation, the meaning of their work and of their questioning of the re­
ality.
2
The point I want to make here is that it is not accidentally that these discussions 
mentioned here as examples are important today -  some two or three decades 
ago nobody except specialists would really care about them, nobody would pay 
much attention.
The "facts" about Heidegger were quite well known in recent fifty years but 
it was only in the late eighties in France that the inspiring discussions took pla­
ce -  when questions that intellectuals asked (among them -  philosophers, an 
important distinction to be carefully drawn) began to be also about themselves. 
The questions are born out of the concern for their image in culture, for their 
"mission" in it (as modernity used to see it). Heidegger's "affair" engaged to 
various degrees some from among the greatest French and German minds of 
the end of the century, just as de Man's "affair" raised highest emotions in 
America -  and questions asked were philosophical ones concerning the philo­
sopher's "life” and "work", "work" referred to "life". They were about a betray­
al of a certain modern ethos that was formed in the times of Dreyfus' affair in 
France (Zola: j'accuse\), of a certain morally obliging way of life of the philo­
sopher in culture.
Thus, the question is of the intellectual, freedom -  and responsibility that 
stops that freedom at some point (and may lead to significant discussions from 
Zola to Benda to Sartre, and then recently in America to Noam Chomsky, Paul 
Bove and Edward Said).
Now I would like to show two extreme attitudes towards philosophy in 
post-war years (in France), still available to us as the horizon of our choices: a 
Hegelian and the Nietzschean one. I mean here the Hegel of Alexandre Kojeve 
and the Nietzsche as read by Derrida, Klossowski and Deleuze. Kojeve (in his 
“Hegel, Marx, and Christianity") said the following: "the future of the world, 
and thereby the meaning of the present and the meaning of the past will de­
pend, in a final analysis, on the contemporary interpretations of Hegel's works", 
to put it briefly - the future of the world will depend on whether we will be re­
ading Hegel. It is important, I suppose, to remember the permanence of that 
belief in the value of philosophy (common, incidentally, also to Husserl from 
his last Prague and Vienna lectures, and Heidegger after his "turn" to whom a
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paraphrased saying can be attributed: the future of the (German) world -  but 
also of Europe -  will depend on whether we will be reading Hölderlin). Hege­
lian questions, as we know, had dominated (almost) whole post-war French 
thought -  as Michel Foucault said in his opening College de France lecture in 
1970: "all our epoch attempts to flee Hegel". The abrupt contrast to -  and an 
antidote against -  the hegemony of Hegel was (rediscovered and reinterpreted) 
Nietzsche. The passage from Hegel to Nietzsche happened in the French cultu­
re in the sixties, and since then it has rarely come to philosophical minds that 
the (Kojevian) "future of the world" may depend on a "reading of Nietzsche", 
or on a reading of any other philosopher, for that matter. The philosopher who 
puts it most explicitly is Richard Rorty, bringing about a storm of criticism 
from all sides, both from political and philosophical right and left.
Another point is the following: one might consider whether the pair of He- 
gel/Nietzsche read in that way (the former of the Marxist and Heideggerian 
Kojeve and the latter of Deleuze, Klossowski and Derrida) is not parallel to the 
pair of modern and postmodern intellectuals. Asking what the intellectual was 
supposed to do according to readings of Hegel and Nietzsche, and how the 
French thought made a radical change from Hegel to Nietzsche in the sixties 
(and then again, with a new generation of philosophers who publish manifesto­
es Why Are We Not Nietzscheans?, as some argue, once again away from Nie­
tzsche in the nineties) -  we are asking about a (new) figure of the intellectual 
today, as the change of its status may also result from that turn. Nietzsche may 
be a key point in today's discussions of the role and tasks of the philosopher, 
starting with Derrida and Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus of the latter and Guattari, Ly­
otard from Libidinal Economy or -  in the USA -  Allan Bloom on the one hand 
(with his "Nietzscheanized America" from The Closing o f the American Mind) 
and Richard Rorty on the other (with his Nietzsche contrasted with Heidegger 
in The Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity -  the one whose fault was "taking 
philosophy -  too -  seriously", as the title of his review of infamous Victor Fa­
rias's book says). "The New Nietzsche" in that context turns out to be a signifi­
cant point of reference in discussions of the intellectual today (especially con­
sidering the opposition of a new generation of French philosophers defining 
themselves against him as well as against post-structuralists on the basis of 
different social tasks of the philosopher).
Thus, to sum up, one could think of two poles in thinking about the role of 
philosophy in culture and politics and about two respective self-images of the 
philosopher in culture: on the one of them there would be Hegel (and Kojeve, 
as well as the "serious" Heidegger getting others read Hölderlin) who make the 
history of the world dependent on philosophy; and on the other there would be 




There is a constant theme in the philosophical tradition -  there is a group of 
people who know more than others as they have an access to truth, who di­
scover truth with power of their intellects and -  if need be -  may present it to 
the world in a softer, comprehensible way. The philosopher-prophet used to tell 
others "what to do" (as Foucault's "universal intellectual"), used to be an unqu­
estioned authority because he knew the deepest -  i.e. philosophical context 
(the metaphoric of tearing away surface layers to get to the hidden essence is 
not accidental here). He used to be the authority looking at anything "from a 
philosophical point of view" i.e. that of the world, humankind, reason, the 
universal rather than the particular, the eternal rather than the transient etc. The 
conversation with him used to require rising to the philosophical level on the 
part of his interlocutor. As Richard Rorty put it in his Philosophy and the Mir­
ror o f Nature -  the philosopher used to express his opinion in all matters, his 
voice being the most important one in ongoing discussions.
I think it is possible to catch a glimpse of the account of the contrast be­
tween modernity and postmodernity through the figure of the main hero of 
modernity i.e. of the intellectual, produced for its needs and who, with qu­
estioning of it, may recede towards a less prominent role in culture. The tradi­
tional intellectual recedes as part of the world that disappears together with 
modernity -  that is the question discussed for twenty years in philosophy and 
sociology. The traditional intellectual with a superior status in culture in the 
past (as shown by e.g. Richard Rorty) in postmodern philosophers's view has 
to start looking for another place in it; thus there return such questions as: do 
intellectuals as products of modernity paradigmatically from Zola to Sartre 
have any significant future in postmodernity? Are they as species doomed to 
be extinct? Is the very category of "postmodern intellectual" contradiction in 
terms? What are the tasks of the said postmodern intellectual? What are his 
obligations, if any -  and to whom? Is he to be a social critic and what is his 
moral and political responsibility today? Is philosophy as a discipline well pre­
pared to such postmodern challenges? Does it react to what is going on in cul­
ture today?
4
Still another question, to close my remarks, is the role of intellectuals in Cen­
tral Europe in the times of huge social transformations and the usefulness of 
Western discussions referred to here for the consciousness of intellectuals in 
our part of the world. The question could be put in the following way: what
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can we, inhabitants of postcommunist Central Europe, expect from the so- 
called postmodern thought? Is postmodern thought an intellectual challenge to 
us, is it worth being thought over by us, with respect to our questions and our 
problems? The very question about the intellectual in that part of the world is 
extremely important, I suppose. His place, role and status is -  to some degree -  
only in the process of formation now, in a new and somehow unexpected situ­
ation following 1989, that annus mirabilis, therefore I strongly believe that qu­
estions asked in postmodern thought with respect to the intellectual may turn 
out to be interesting. I have personally come to the conclusion that it is wor­
thwhile to try to make use of experiences of postmodern philosophy, bearing in 
mind that it is a radical thinking which appeared in a different cultural (and 
economic) situation. The thought of Rorty, Derrida, Lyotard or Foucault may 
be useful, responding to a different degree to our double -  Central European 
and postmodern -  experience. Not all its questions are equally burning, but al­
so not all of them are sufficiently exposed there from our perspective. So I be­
lieve potentially there are many essential connections and parallels, points of 
convergence and questions equally important in the West and in Central Euro­
pe. Nevertheless, the urgency of thinking through certain questions is greater 
here than in the West because what is at stake here is the very fragile social 
future, still indeterminate and still not fully clear. While the West goes on to a 
large extent no matter what philosophers and theoreticians think, here social 
thinking can -  although not necessarily has to -  undergo potentially bigger 
transformations owing to philosophy and theory. Thus the responsibility of the 
intellectual seems to be much more serious than e.g. in the USA, hence the ne­
ed of thinking about his ethics, hence the need of thinking about some essential 
questions from a different perspective -  perhaps the one in which the place of 
the intellectual is not so determinate, and so degraded, as in the West.
And finally, let me stress how important it is to look at several recent hot 
debates in philosophy from this particular perspective of the self-image of the 
philosopher himself. All I wanted to show in the present paper was that when 
looked at from such an angle, the ethical and philosophical discussions addres­
sed here gain an additional sense. The main question is thus the following: who 
are philosophers? What are they going to achieve? What is their relation to 
society and to culture? What are their tasks and obligations and to whom? What 
is their self-image today? All we may be sure is that the traditional self-image 
of the philosopher is trembling; whether it actually gets changed, or whether it 
can get changed at all, is an important issue within philosophy of culture.
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